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THE PROPRIETY OF PROSPECTIVE RELIEF AND
ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS AGAINST STATE-COURT
JUDGES IN FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS
by
STEPHEN J. SHAPIRO*
I. INTRODUCTION
D URING THE PAST thirty years, the United States Supreme Court has refined
a system of immunities for governmental officials when those officials
are sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' for violation of constitutional rights.2 The
kind of immunity granted varies with the kind of governmental function exer-
cised by the official when committing the alleged constitutional violation. 3 Per-
sons exercising legislative functions are absolutely immune from suit either for
damages4 or for prospective (declaratory or injunctive) relief.5 Those exercis-
ing prosecutorial functions are absolutely immune from damages6 but may be
sued for prospective relief.7 Those exercising executive functions are granted
*Associate Professor of Law, Ohio Northern University College of Law, B.A., Haverford College (1971);
J.D., University of Pennsylvania College of Law (1976).
'This statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State of Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of
the United States or other person with the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured
in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979). Theoretically the same system of immunities is available when suit
is brought under the other remaining post-civil war Civil Rights Statutes, codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1982, 1985 and 1986, and all of the arguments made in this article would be applicable to all such suits.
As a practical matter, however, the vast majority of civil rights suits brought against state and local
governmental officials are brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
2Although the great majority of § 1983 suits are brought to redress violations of federal constitutional
rights, that statute also encompasses claims based on purely statutory violations of federal law. Maine
v. Thiboutout, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
'Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978). The Court in Butz reasoned that an official's immunity should
be determined not by his official title or position, but by the functions and responsibilities which he exercises.
"Judges have absolute immunity not because of their particular location within the Government but because
of the special nature of their responsibilities .... The cluster of immunities protecting the various participants
in judge-supervised trials stems from the characteristics of the judicial process rather than its location."
Id. at 511-12. In that case absolute judicial immunity from damages was granted to an executive department
hearing examiner, rather than the good-faith immunity normally afforded executive officials. Scheur v.
Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
'Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951).
'Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 731-34 (1980).
6 1mbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
'Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 736-7 (1980) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975) and Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
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only a conditional, good-faith immunity from damage awards8 and also may
be sued for prospective relief.9 While it is settled that those persons exercising
judicial functions are entitled to absolute immunity from damage actions,'"
the one piece still missing from this jigsaw puzzle of immunities is whether
they may be sued for prospective relief. The Supreme Court has not yet decid-
ed whether judges acting in their judicial capacity may be sued for declaratory
or injunctive relief."
At least seven circuits have held that judicial immunity does not bar such
relief in appropriate circumstances.' 2 Injunctive suits against judges should not
be allowed merely to overturn incorrect rulings on constitutional issues.' 3 Neither
should they be allowed as a normal method of challenging the constitutionality
of a statute, when the judge's only involvement is to adjudicate a controversy
arising under the statute." Such suits are necessary, however, and should be
allowed to restrain a judge from carrying out an unconstitutional course of
conduct from the bench, such as sentencing defendants to jail in lieu of bail
for a non-incarcerable offense. In the case of Allen v. Burke,'5 a district court
'Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (School board members); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(State governor); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (Police officers).
'See, e.g., Edleman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (State welfare director); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S.
267 (1977) (State governor).
'Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
"In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719 (1980), the Court specifically stated
that it had not decided the issue. "However, we have never held that judicial immunity absolutely insulates
judges from declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to their judicial acts. The Courts of Appeals appear
to be divided on the question whether judicial immunity bars declaratory or injunctive relief; we have
not addressed the question." Id. at 735. The Court noted that a state judge had been among the defendants
in Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972), where the Court held that § 1983 overcame the barrier to
enjoining state-court proceedings erected by 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Court also affirmed a judgment against
both state-court judges and a state prosecutor enjoining enforcement of state statutes in Gerstein v. Pugh
420 U.S. 103 (1975). In neither case, however, did the Court specifically address the question of judicial
immunity to declaratory and injunctive relief. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 735, n.14 (1980). The Court
also noted two cases, Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971) and O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974),
in which the Court reversed injunctions against defendants who included state-court judges on other grounds,
without mentioning the issue of judicial immunity. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 735, n.14 (1980).
"Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669, 672-3 (3d Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981); Heimbach
v. Village of Lyons, 597 F.2d 344, 347 (2d Cir. 1979); Harris v. Harvey, 605 F.2d 330, 335, n.7 (7th Cir.
1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 938 (1980); Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674, 676 (7th Cir. 1978); Kelsey v. Fitzgerald,
574 F.2d 443, 444 (8th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978); Briggs v. Goodwin,
569 F.2d 10, 15, n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Williams, 532 F.2d 120, 121-22 (8th Cir. 1976);
Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom., 454 U.S.
83 (1981); Hansen v. Ahlgrimm, 520 F.2d 768, 769 (7th Cir. 1975); Fowler v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694,
696 (4th Cir. 1973); Jacobson v. Schaeffer, 441 F.2d 127, 130 (7th Cir. 1971). See also, WXYZ, Inc. v.
Hand, 658 F.2d 420 (6th Cir. 1981), in which the Sixth Circuit recently granted injunctive relief against
a judge without explicitly discussing the issue of judicial immunity. In some of the cases listed above,
relief was properly denied on grounds other than judicial immunity. This paper is not arguing that declaratory
or injunctive relief should normally or often be granted against judges, only in those cases where other
avenues of relief are inadequate. See infra text accompanying notes 13-15 and infra 70-80.
"Baier v. Parker, 523 F. Supp. 288, 292-3 (M.D. La. 1981).
"In Re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17 (1st Cir. 1982); Mendez v. Heller, 530
F.2d 457 (2d Cir. 1976); Gras v. Stevens, 415 F. Supp. 1148 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
"No. 81-0040A (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981), aff'd, 690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982), cert. grantedsub nom. Pulliam
v. Allen, 103 S. Ct. 1873 (1983).
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in the Eastern District of Virginia, in line with Fourth Circuit precedent,' 6 en-
joined a state magistrate from just such a practice.
Whether injunctive or declaratory relief may be obtained against a judge
is important in another context: whether attorney's fees may be awarded to
the plaintiff who successfully attains such relief. The district court awarded
attorney's fees against the defendant magistrate in Allen v. Burke, I7 and this
award was affirmed by the Fourth Circuit. 8 Relying on Supreme Court of
Virginia v. Consumers Union 9 and the legislative history of the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,20 the court held that attorney's fees may
be recovered against a judicial officer when prospective relief is properly award-
ed, even though a damage award would be barred by judicial immunity. 2'
The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to determine whether judicial
immunity bars the award of attorney's fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 against
a member of the judiciary acting in his judicial capacity.22 In order to decide
the attorney's fees issue, the Court will probably have to address the underly-
ing question of prospective relief. If persons acting in a judicial capacity are
absolutely immune from suit, as are legislators, then the Court will not allow
the award of attorney's fees. It has previously determined that Congress did
not intend an award of attorney's fees to be based on acts for which defen-
dants enjoy absolute immunity from suit.23 On the other hand, if the Court
finds that injunctive relief was appropriate, as this article argues that it should,2"
then it should also allow the fee award to stand. Prior cases indicate that Con-
gress intended to allow attorney's fees awards when prospective relief had been
awarded against a defendant, even if that defendant was immune from a damage
award. 5
'Timmerman v. Brown, 528 F.2d 811, 814 (4th Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Leeke v.
Timmerman, 454 U.S. 83 (1981).
'No. 81-0040A (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981).
'1690 F.2d 376 (4th Cir. 1982).
'"446 U.S. 719 (1980).
"Pub. L. No. 94-559, § 2, 90 State. 2641 (1976) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)). This statute provides:
In any action or proceeding to enforce a provision of sections 1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986
of this title, title IX of Public Law 92-318 [20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.], or in any civil action or
proceedings, by or on behalf of the United States of America, to enforce, or charging a violation
of, a provision of the United States Internal Revenue Code, or title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 [42 U.S.C. 200d et seq.], the court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other
than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs.
"Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d at 379.
"Pulliam, 103 S. Ct. 1873 (1983).
"Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 738-39 (1980).
"See infra text accompanying notes 68-101.
"Consumers Union 446 U.S. at 738-9 (1980); Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 693-700 (1978). See infra
text accompanying notes 107-127.
Summer, 1983]
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II. JUDICIAL IMMUNITY FROM DAMAGE LIABILITY
The seminal opinion concerning judicial immunity in the United States
came in the nineteenth century case of Bradley v. Fisher.26 Plaintiff, an attorney,
sought damages from Judge Fisher, a judge of the criminal court of the District
of Columbia, for wrongfully disbarring him from that court. 7 The Supreme
Court held that judges of courts of general jurisdiction are absolutely immune
from liability for damages for their judicial acts. Such immunity remained intact
even if the act was done maliciously or corruptly" and even if the act was in
excess of the court's jurisdiction.29
The Court based its holding on the supposedly "settled doctrine of the
English courts for many centuries"3 and also on the importance of an indepen-
dent and courageous judiciary.
For it is a general principle of the highest importance to the proper admini-
stration of justice that a judicial officer, in exercising the authority vested
in him, shall be free to act upon his own convictions, without apprehen-
sion of personal consequences to himself. Liability to answer to every one
who might feel himself aggrieved by the action of the judge, would be
inconsistent with the possession of this freedom, and would destroy that
independence without which no judiciary can be either respectable or
useful."
Although the immunity doctrine established in Bradley v. Fisher has been
somewhat refined by several more recent Supreme Court decisions, the basic
holding and rationale of the case have remained virtually intact. In Pierson
v. Ray 2 the Court held that absolute judicial immunity remained a valid defense
to a damage action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.11 Relying on the
reasoning of Tenney v. Brandhove, 3, which held that legislative immunity sur-
vived the enactment of the post-civil war civil rights statutes, the Court held
2680 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872).
27The Supreme Court in an earlier opinion held that Judge Fisher did not have jurisdiction to disbar Bradley,
and ordered Bradley's reinstatement. Ex parte Bradley, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 364 (1869).
"Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347-49. The Court reasoned: "Few persons sufficiently irritated
to institute an action against a judge for his judicial acts would hesitate to ascribe any character to the
acts which would be essential to the maintenance of the action." Id. at 348.
The main distinction between absolute and qualified immunity has been that the former protects actions
taken regardless of their motives, while the latter protects only actions taken in good faith.
"The Court distinguished between acts done "in excess of jurisdiction" which were covered by the immunity,
and acts done in "the clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter" which were not. Id. at 351.
1°1d. at 347. Not all commentators have agreed with the Court's assessment of English common law.
"Actually, English law began with a position of general judicial liability and developed only limited
exceptions on grounds that are irrelevant to a discussion of judicial liability today." Feinman and Cohen,
Suing Judges: History and Theory, 31 S.C.L. REV. 201, 203 (1980). See also, Roth and Hagan, Tracing
the Judicial Immunity Doctrine: A View From Kingly Times to the Present, ST. CT. J. Summ. 1982, at 4.
"Bradley, 80 US. (13 Wall.) at 347.
"386 U.S. 547 (1967).
"See supra note 1 for the text of this statute.
"4341 U.S. 367 (1951).
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4
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss1/3
PROSPECTIVE RELIEF AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS
that it would not presume that Congress intended to abrogate the common
law doctrine of judicial immunity absent a "clear indication" to do so." Despite
references to judicial liability in the Congressional debates pointed out by Jusitice
Douglas in dissent, 36 the Court found no such intention to abolish judicial
immunity.
The third major Supreme Court case dealing with judicial immunity is
Stump v. Sparkman." The Court held Judge Stump immune from damages
for ordering the sterilization of a fifteen year old girl without a hearing, based
on the ex parte application of her mother. The Court held that neither the
absence of authority to enter the sterilization order nor the failure to afford
the plaintiff due process destroyed the judge's immunity. That immunity attaches
to any "judicial act ' 38 unless there is a "clear absence of all jurisdiction." '39
Since granting petitions affecting the affairs of minors was a judicial act not
clearly outside his jurisdiction, Judge Stump was held to be immune from
damages."
All of the major Supreme Court rulings dealing with immunity for judicial
functions have dealt with the issue in the context of liability from damages.
As noted by the Court in Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union,"
"we have not addressed the question" of whether "judicial immunity absolutely
insulates judges from declaratory or injunctive relief with respect to their judicial
acts." 2 The Court has, however, answered this question for those exercising
legislative and prosecutorial functions. Although prosecutors and legislators
are both, like judges, absolutely immune from damage liability, 3 they are treated
differently as regards injunctive and declaratory relief. Prosecutors are sub-
ject to such relief 4 while legislators are absolutely immune from all such suits.4 5
It is instructive, therefore, in determining how the Court should rule on this
question as applied to judges, to examine the Court's decisions regarding
legislative and prosecutorial immunity. Such an examination shows that it would
be more reasonable for the Court to treat judges like prosecutors than like
legislators, and allow prospective relief under appropriate circumstances.
"Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554. The Court also somewhat extended the immunity doctrine, which as stated
in Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872), applied in its broadest form only to courts of "superior
or general" jurisdiction. Id. at 347. The judge in Pierson was a municipal police justice, a judicial officer
of an "inferior" court of limited jurisdiction. No distinction was made on this basis, however.
6Pierson, 341 U.S. at 559-63 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
435 U.S. 349 (1978).
"Id. at 360.
"Id. at 357 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335 (1872)).
"°Stump, 435 U.S. at 362-3.
4"446 U.S. at 735.
"Id. at 735, n.13.
"Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (Prosecutors); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951)
(Legislators).
"'Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 736-37.
"Id. at 733.
Summer, 1983]
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III. PROSECUTORIAL AND LEGISLATIVE IMMUNITY
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of prosecutorial immunity from
section 1983 damage actions in the case of Imbler v. Pachtman." Although
most other executive officials receive only qualified immunity, 7 the Court held
that state prosecutors were absolutely immune from damages for actions taken
in their prosecutorial capacities. 8 The Court explicitly based its decision on
a direct analogy between prosecutors and judges: "The common-law immunity
of a prosecutor is based upon the same considerations that underlie the common-
law immunity of judges and grand jurors acting within the scope of their
duties." 49
Like a judge, a prosecutor must exercise his duties "with courage and
independence," 5 free of the fear of personal consequences to himself.
If a prosecutor had only a qualified immunity, the threat of § 1983
suits would undermine performance of his duties no less than would the
threat of common-law suits for malicious prosecution. A prosecutor is
duty bound to exercise his best judgment both in deciding which suits to
bring and in conducting them in court. The public trust of the prosecutor's
office would suffer if he were constrained in making every decision by
the consequences in terms of his own potential liability in a suit for
damages. Such suits could be expected with some frequency, for a defen-
dant often will transform his resentment at being prosecuted into the ascrip-
tion of improper and malicious actions to the State's advocate. Cf. Bradley
v. Fisher, 13 Wall., at 348; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S., at 554. Further,
if the prosecutor could be made to answer in court each time such a person
charged him with wrongdoing, his energy and attention would be diverted
from the pressing duty of enforcing the criminal law.5'
The Court completed the analogy by referring to prosecutorial immunity as
"quasi-judicial." 5
The law as to the amenability of state prosecutors to suits for declaratory
and injunctive relief has developed very differently, indeed. Not only are pro-
secutors not immune from such suits, they are the usual and accepted defen-
dants in suits challenging the constitutionality of state law. "[T]hey are natural
targets for § 1983 injunctive suits since they are the state officers who are
threatening to enforce and who are enforcing the law.'"
4'424 U.S. 409 (1976).
"Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975) (School board members); Scheur v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974)
(State governor); Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1977) (State governor).
"'Imbler, 424 U.S. at 427.
"Id. at 422-23.
"Id. at 423 (quoting Pearson v. Reed, 6 Cal. App. 2d 227, 287, 44 P.2d 592, 597 (1935)).
5'Imbler, 424 U.S. at 424-25.
"Id. at 420.
"Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 736 (1980).
AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:1
6
Akron Law Review, Vol. 17 [1984], Iss. 1, Art. 3
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol17/iss1/3
PROSPECTIVE RELIEF AND ATTORNEY'S FEES AWARDS
This doctrine dates back to the 1908 case, Ex Parte Young. " In Young,
the Supreme Court upheld, against an eleventh amendment challenge," a federal
court injunction restraining the Attorney General of Minnesota from enforc-
ing an unconstitutional state statute. The reasoning used by the Supreme Court
to circumvent the eleventh amendment has been criticized as illogical and pure
fiction. 6 Yet those same critics have considered the result of the case (that those
responsible for enforcing unconstitutional state laws may be subject to injunc-
tive relief in a federal court) absolutely necessary to the functioning of our federal
system. Otherwise it would not always be possible to force the states and their
officers to comply with the mandates of the United States Constitution."
Legislative immunity has derived from a different source than judicial and
prosecutorial immunity. While the latter immunities have developed through
the common law, legislative immunity was statutorily based in England" and
constitutionally based in the United States. In deciding that legislative immunity
protected a state senator from a federal civil rights action for damages, the
Supreme Court cited both to the speech and debate clause of the Federal
Constitution59 and to similar provisions in the constitutions of forty-one states. 61
Although the Court in Tenney v. Brandhove6l recognized that as a state senator
the defendant was not actually protected by the speech and debate clause, the
opinion depended heavily on it. The speech and debate clause gives very broad
protection to members of Congress. Not only has it been held to prohibit
declaratory and injunctive relief,62 but unlike judicial and prosecutorial immunity
it protects members of Congress from criminal prosecution for covered legislative
acts.63
It is not surprising, therefore, that when it came time to determine whether
state officials acting in a legislative capacity were immune from prospective
"209 U.S. 123 (1908).
"Defendants argued that the suit was in reality against the state, which is prohibited by the eleventh
amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. X1.
5617 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, AND E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4321 at 356, 359
(1978); (hereinafter cited as WRIGHT, MILLER, AND COOPER); Davis, Suing the Government by Falsely
Pretending to Sue an Officer. 29 U. CHI. L. REV. 435, 437 (1962). The Court reasoned that by enforcing
the unconstitutional law, an officer is stripped of his status as a state officer and "is subject in his person
to the consequences of his conduct," 209 U.S. at 160. The illogic of this fiction results from the fact that
only state action is subject to the prohibitions of the fourteenth amendment. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S.
3 (1883). Young's action was considered private action for purposes of the eleventh amendment and state
action for purposes of the fourteenth.
""Yet in perspective, the doctrine of Ex parte Young seems indispensable to the establishment of
constitutional government and to the rule of law." WRIGHT, MILLER AND COOPER, supra note 56, at 360.
""That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached
or questioned in any Court or Place Out of Parliament" I Win. & Mary, Sess. 2, c. I1.
"1"[Flor any Speech or Debate in either House, they [Senators and Representatives] shall not be questioned
in any other place." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6.
"Tenney 341 U.S. at 375-76, n.5 (1951).
"1341 U.S. 367 (1951).
"Eastland v. United States Servicemen's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
63Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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relief the Court answered this question affirmatively.64 This time the Court's
reliance on the speech and debate clause was even more explicit. The opinion
states: "we generally have equated the legislative immunity to which state
legislators are entitled under § 1983 to that accorded Congressmen under the
Constitution." 65
There is another difference between prosecutors and legislators which,
although unstated by the Court, may have led it to grant legislative immunity
from prospective relief when such immunity is not available to prosecutors.
Legislative action, although very important, is not self-executing. Legislators
make the rules, but others must enforce them. There is no need, therefore,
for prospective relief from legislative action, since such relief can be obtained
against the official responsible for enforcement. If the legislature passes an un-
constitutional statute it is not necessary to obtain an injunction forcing it to
repeal it. Through the fiction of Ex parte Young 66 it is possible to have the
statute declared unconstitutional by suing the enforcing officer. It was, as noted
above,67 the importance of providing some procedure for forcing state com-
pliance with the Federal Constitution which led to the tortured logic of Young.
Unlike officials acting in a legislative capacity, a judge exercising his judicial
function can cause direct harm, which in some cases may only be preventable
by prospective relief granted against him. The next section of this article will
identify such situations, explain why prospective relief against a judge may be
necessary in such cases, and argue that such relief would not contravene the
policies behind judicial immunity.
IV. GRANTING PROSPECTIvE RELIEF AGAINST JUDGES
As noted above, 68 the main policy argument supporting judicial immunity
from damage suits is to allow judges to decide cases courageously, according
to their best judgment, without fear of personal liability for an incorrect deci-
sion. This, of course, is the strongest policy supporting all grants of official
immunity. It is clear that this policy would not be harmed by allowing injunc-
tive or declaratory relief against a judge in his official capacity, since it would
not result in any personal harm or liability to him.69
A secondary reason advanced for immunity might have somewhat more
validity as an argument for immunity from prospective relief. This is the fear
that allowing such relief might result in a flood of suits by unsatisfied litigants
"Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 733-34 (1980).
"Id. at 733.
"209 U.S. 123 (1908). See supra note 56 for an explanation of the "fiction" of Ex parte Young.
"7See supra note 57, and accompanying text.
6See supra text accompanying note 31.
69'The grant of injunctive relief in a case like this would not have the in terrorem effect on state judges
that the threat of a subsequent damage action would have." Law Students Civil Rights Research Coun.,
Inc. v. Wadmond, 299 F. Supp. 117, 123 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (three judge court; Friendly, J., concurring).
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which would divert "his energy and attention" 0 from his judicial tasks. Failure
to extend judicial immunity to declaratory and injunctive relief would not,
however, result in such a flood. The overwhelming majority of such suits would
be barred by other jurisdictional doctrines such as the requirement of a case
or controversy, adequate legal remedies, and mootness. Using such doctrines
to weed out improper suits against judges, rather than establishing a blanket
immunity to suit, would have the advantage of allowing relief where necessary
to protect constitutional rights The Supreme Court noted this itself in Supreme
Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union.' After noting that a number of cir-
cuits had held that judicial immunity does not extend to declaratory or injunc-
tive relief, the Court stated:
It is rare, however, that any kind of relief has been entered against judges
in actions brought under § 1983 and seeking to restrain or otherwise con-
trol or affect the future performance of their adjudicative role. Such suits
have been recurringly dismissed for a variety of reasons other than
immunity. Hence, the question of awarding attorney's fees against judges
will not often arise.72
For example, a party attacking the constitutionality of a statute should
not normally be allowed to sue a judge merely because he will adjudicate a
case arising under the statute. The First Circuit has correctly pointed out:
. . . at least ordinarily, no 'case or controversy' exists between a judge
who adjudicates claims under a statute and a litigant who attacks the con-
stitutionality of the statute .... [O]ne seeking to enjoin the enforcement
of a statute on constitutional grounds ordinarily sues the enforcement
official authorized to bring suit under the statute . . ..
Similarly, a party dissatisfied with a judge's ruling on an issue of con-
stitutional law is normally required to appeal the judge's ruling. He may not
sue the judge as a substitute for appeal, which is normally an adequate legal
remedy to protect his rights. 74 Even in the small number of cases where appeal
will not adequately protect a person's rights, if the judge's error was a single
isolated incident, declaratory or injunctive relief may still be denied on the prin-
ciple of mootness. If, as in most cases, the harm has already occurred and there
is no reason to believe that the action will be repeated, then the case is moot.
On the other hand, if a judge is engaged in a continued pattern of un-
7
"Imbler, 424 U.S. at 425 (1976). Although the Court was actually discussing the reasons for prosecutorial
immunity, this secondary reason for immunity is also applicable to judges.
7'446 U.S. at 735, n.13.
721d.
"In Re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 21 (1st Cir. 1982).
'Normally, the doctrine of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and its progeny prohibits federal courts
from issuing declaratory or injunctive relief which interferes with an ongoing state-court criminal or quasi-
criminal action, unless the normal appellate process would not provide an adequate remedy for constitutional
violations.
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constitutional action, to which appeal or suit against other defendants does
not provide adequate relief, then the judge should not be immune from a
declaratory or injunctive suit brought to halt such action. Although the number
of such suits should be small, the necessity for them in some cases may be very
great.
Take, for example, a hypothetical situation based on a slight variation
of the facts in the well-known case of Stump v. Sparkman. 7 The Supreme
Court held Judge Stump immune from damages for ordering, without statutory
authorization, the sterilization of a fifteen year old girl based on the ex parte
application of her mother. The girl had not been afforded due process rights,
including appointment of counsel and opportunity to appeal. The unfairness
of that result "elicited a uniformly critical response from scholarly writers," 76
many of whom called for reform of the immunity doctrine." The Supreme
Court acknowledged the "unfairness to litigants that sometimes results"78 from
judicial immunity but reiterated the need for a judge to act "without apprehen-
sion of personal consequences to himself."" Assume for a moment that rather
than being an isolated past instance Judge Stump's action had been part of
an ongoing practice, and that there was evidence that he intended to continue
to grant exparte sterilization orders against unrepresented minors. If suit were
brought by an organization representing the rights of minors to enjoin the judge
from continuing with such practice, there would be absolutely no justification
for denying relief.80
"435 U.S. 349 (1978).
"Roth and Hagan, supra note 30, at 7.
"See, e.g., Block, Stump v. Sparkman and the History of Judicial Immunity, 1980 DUKE L. J. 879;
Feldthusen, Judicial Immunity: In Search of an Appropriate Limiting Formula, 29 UNB. L. J. 73 (1980);
Feinman and Cohen, supra note 30 at 203; Nagel, Judicial Immunity and Sovereignty, 6 HASTINGS CONST.
L. Q. 237 (1978); Nahmod, Persons Who Are Not Persons, Absolute Individual Immunity Under Section
1983, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 1 (1978); Rosenberg, Stump v. Sparkman: The Doctrine of Judicial Impunity,
64 VA. L. REV. 833 (1978); Way, A Call for Limits to Judicial Immunity: Must Judges be Kings in Their
Courts, 64 JUDICATURE 390 (1981); Young, Supreme Court Report, 64 A.B.A.J. 740 (1978); Note, Judicial
Immunity: Developments in Federal Law, 33 BAYLOR L. REV. 351 (1981); Note, Stump v. Sparkman: The
Scope of Judicial and Derivative Immunities Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 6 WOMEN'S RIGHTS L. REP. 107
(1979-80).
"Stump, 435 U.S. at 365 (1978).
"1Id. (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1872)).
"It is clear that no alternative to suit against the judge could afford adequate relief. Since individual parents
could present sterilization petitions, no executive department enforcement official could be enjoined from
bringing the sterilization proceedings. Since the operation had been ordered exparte with no representation
or right of appeal provided for the minor, no individual appellate remedies would suffice. Although "it
is ordinarily presumed that judges will comply with a declaration of a statute's unconstitutionality without
further compulsion." In Re Justices of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d, 17, 23 (1st Cir.
1982), this only speaks to the kind of prospective relief to be granted, not whether it should be granted.
It may be more proper for a federal court to grant declaratory relief first, following with an injunction
only if necessary.
[Vol. 17:1
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The facts of Pulliam v. Allen,' currently pending before the Supreme
Court, while less horrifying than the preceeding hypothetical, fit this profile
of cases in which prospective relief should be allowed against a judicial officer.
Plaintiffs Allen and Nicholson were both arrested for minor misdemeanors, 2
both non-incarcerable offenses, for which the maximum penalty was a monetary
fine. 3 After arrest the men were brought before Magistrate Pulliam, who set
bond' and when the men were unable to pay the bond, committed them to
the County Jail where they remained until trial.8 5 Neither man was appraised
of his rights or provided with legal counsel at any time preceeding or during
his incarceration.
After his trial on the merits, 6 Allen filed a section 1983 suit in federal
district court against Magistrate Pulliam,"2 asking that the practice of incarcer-
ating persons pending trial for non-incarcerable offenses be declared unconstitu-
tional and that defendant be enjoined therefrom. The Office of Attorney General
of Virginia represented the magistrate throughout the proceedings and
"vigorously contested" 8 the constitutionality of her actions.
The district court found that it was Magistrate Pulliam's practice to require
bond for non-incarcerable offenses, 9 and that during a five-month period she
had committed at least thirty-four persons who had been arrested for such
offenses to jail for failure to pay bond. 9° The district court entered summary
judgment, declaring the practice a violation of due process and equal protec-
tion and enjoined further continuation of the practice. 9'
Both because of the lack of access to legal representation and because of
the comparatively brief jail confinement, the alternative remedies of appeal,
mandamus, and habeas corpus were not viable options to challenge the
"Oringinally filed as Allen v. Burke, 690 F.2d 376 (6th Cir. 1982), cert. granted sub nom. Pulliam v.
Allen, 103 S. Ct. 1873 (1983). The facts are taken from the unreported District Court order and opinion,
No. 81-0040A (E.D. Va. June 4, 1981), reproduced in the Joint Appendix, printed for the United States
Supreme Court at 22-32. Page citations are to the Joint Appendix.
"Allen was arrested for breach of the peace by cursing and abusing, Va. Code § 18.2-416 (1982); Nicholson
was arrested four times for being drunk in public, VA. CODE § 18.2-388 (1982).
"Section 18.2-416 is a class 3 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $500 fine; Section 18.2-388
is a class 4 misdemeanor for which the maximum penalty is a $100 fine.
"Bond for Allen was set at $250, bond for Nicholson set at $30. Joint Appendix at 24-25.
"Allen was held in jail for 14 days, Nicholson for periods ranging between two and six days. Id. at 25.
"Allen was originally found guilty; the judgment was subsequently reopened, however, and Allen was
found not guilty. Id.
"Originally, suit was also filed against Judge Burke, the trial court judge in Allen's case. Judge Burke
was properly dismissed from the action since he had no part in the unconstitutional activity. Id. at 23.
Plaintiff Nicholson intervened in the suit four months later. Several of his unconstitutional incarcerations
had occurred after the suit had been filed against Magistrate Pulliam. Id. at 25.
"Allen v. Burke (E.D. Va. Order and Opinion of July 6, 1981), Joint Appendix at 41.
"Opinion of June 4, 1981, Joint Appendix at 25.
"Id. at 26.
' Id. at 22-23.
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practice.92 Neither could suit be brought against the prosecutor, since he was
not the person carrying out the unconstitutional activities. If suit had not been
allowed against the magistrate the plaintiffs might have been left without any
remedy to halt the constitutional violation.
None of the traditional arguments supporting judicial immunity are
applicable to a case such as Pulliam v. Allen. The defendant magistrate will
not compromise her decisions because of the possibility of personal consequences
to her. The only possible consequence to her was in the form of an order re-
quiring her to bring her official conduct in line with the Constitution.93
Neither would allowing such suits result in a flood of litigation which would
require judges to divert significant time and energy from their judicial tasks.
First, the number of such suits which will be allowed will not be very great.9 '
Second, the burden placed on the defendant judge will not be very great. Legal
representation will almost invariably, as was the case in Pulliam, be provided
by the state attorney general. In most cases, the only burden placed on the
judge will be to forward the complaint to the attorney general. 9 This is really
no greater than the burden imposed by the filing of a writ of mandamus against
a judge, 96 and may in fact be less than if the judge's action had been appealed,
which might require the writing of an opinion.
Such cases will often, as was Pulliam, be decided by motion for summary
judgment, based on affidavits and stipulations of fact. Even if a judge's
testimony is occasionally required, however, this should not be a ground for
"Although it is theoretically possible for an unrepresented indigent defendant to make use of such remedies,
it is highly unlikely. The practice of incarcerating persons without benefit of counsel either before or after
trial will usually greatly enhance the possibility that the case will fall into the class of cases where prospective
relief against a judge is necessary and appropriate. See Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1980),
cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981) (suit to enjoin practice of sentencing convicted indigents to jail for
summary offenses without affording right to counsel). Even if plaintiffs had the means to attempt to use
these remedies, it is unlikely that they could have been successful during their brief periods of detention.
The Supreme Court has recognized that brief pretrial detentions are fairly incapable of timely appellate
review. "Pretrial detention is by nature temporary, and it is most unlikely that any given individual could
have his constitutional claim decided on appeal before he is either released or convicted." Gerstein v.
Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 110, n.lI (1975). For further discussion of the unsuitability of mandamus as an
alternative, see infra note 96.
"Her legal representation was provided by the Office of Attorney General of Virginia. Any award of
attorney's fees would not be paid by her personally, but by the state of Virginia. See infra text accompanying
note 115.
"The great majority of suits against judges will be dismissed early on for a variety of reasons other than
judicial immunity. See supra text accompanying notes 70-74.
"If, however, the case proceeded to discovery and trial, some testimony might be required from the defendant
judge. This should not be grounds for dismissing suit. See infra the discussion of Dennis v. Sparks, 449
U.S. 24 (1980), at text accompanying notes 97-102.
"Judges have traditionally been named as defendants when litigants seek writs of mandamus or prohibition.
In re Justices of Supreme Court of Puerto Rico, 695 F.2d 17, 23 (1982); 52 Am. JUR. 2d Mandamus §
301 (1970). The existence of a possible mandamus remedy should not, however, be used as an argument
for denying relief under § 1983. Many states severely limit the situations in which the writ can be used,
i.e., where the question is one of jurisdiction only. Also, relief can be provided only to the individual
litigant, with nothing to guarantee that the unconstitutional action will not be repeated. Additionally,
litigants with a federal constitutional claim should not be forced to litigate it in state court.
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disallowing suit. In Dennis v. Sparks,97 the Supreme Court allowed a damage
action to proceed against persons who had allegedly conspired with a judge,
despite a claim of derivative immunity. Defendants argued that allowing suit
would "seriously erode" the judge's immunity because "testifying takes time
and energy that otherwise might be devoted to judicial duties." 98 The Court
specifically distinguished the case of legislators who were not required "to res-
pond to questions about their legislative acts,"" since legislative immunity,
unlike judicial immunity, was based on the broader speech and debate clause.' 0
Although the Court recognized that in suits such as Dennis v. Sparks "the
judge's integrity and that of the judicial process may be at stake,' 0 ' the Court
refused to hold it barred by judicial immunity.
Judicial immunity arose because it was in the public interest to have
judges who were at liberty to exercise their independent judgment about
the merits of a case without fear of being mulcted for damages should
an unsatisfied litigant be able to convince another tribunal that the judge
acted not only mistakenly but with malice and corruption .... In terms
of undermining a judge's independence and his judicial performance, the
concern that his conduct will be examined in a collateral proceeding against
those with whom he allegedly conspired, a proceeding in which he cannot
be held liable for damages and which he need not defend, is not of the
same order of magnitude as the prospects of being a defendant in a
damages action from complaint to verdict with the attendant possibility
of being held liable for damages if the factfinder mistakenly upholds the
charge of malice or of a corrupt conspiracy with others. These concerns
are not unsubstantial, either for the judge or for the public, but we agree
with the Court of Appeals that the potential harm to the public from
denying immunity to private co-conspirators is outweighed by the benefits
of providing a remedy against those private persons who participate in
subverting the judicial process and in so doing inflict injury on other
persons. "02
Although Dennis is distinguishable from Pulliam in that the judge was dropped
as an actual defendant in Dennis, the Court's view of judicial immunity is very
important. The negative effect on the judiciary was clearly more harmful in
Dennis. The Court was willing to allow the action to proceed, however, since
it was necessary to provide a remedy and the judge would not be subject to
damages. Disallowing suit in Pulliam after allowing it in Dennis would be putting
form over subtance.
"449 U.S. 24 (1980).
"Id. at 30.
99d.
"°*U.S. CONST. art. 1. § 6.
O'Dennis, 449 U.S. at 31.
" *d. at 31-32.
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V. AWARDING ATrORNEY'S FEES WHEN PROSPECTIVE RELIEF IS PROPERLY
GRANTED AGAINST A JUDGE
If the Supreme Court, in deciding Pulliam v. Allen, determines that pro-
spective relief may be awarded against a judicial officer, it will then face the
question of whether attorney's fees may be awarded to the prevailing plaintiff.'0 3
If the Court determines that judges, like legislators, enjoy absolute immunity
from suit for their judicial acts, it will almost certainly reverse the award of
attorney's fees. In Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union'°" the Court
determined that in enacting the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976,105 Congress did not intend to allow fee awards to be entered against
officials who enjoyed absolute immunity from suit.
There is no ... indication in the legislative history of the Act to suggest
that Congress intended to permit an award of attorney's fees to be premised
on acts for which defendants would enjoy absolute legislative immunity.
[T]here is no indication that Congress intended to permit an award of
attorney's fees to be premised on acts that themselves would be insulated
from even prospective relief.'0 6
If, on the other hand, the Court determines that judicial immunity does
not bar declaratory and injunctive relief, Consumers Union just as clearly in-
dicates that an award of attorney's fees would also be proper. The Court held
that the defendant judges, who were absolutely immune from damages for their
enforcement or prosecutorial functions,'0 7 could nonetheless be subject in that
capacity to an attorney's fee award based on properly awarded prospective relief.
"'Actually, the defendant appealed only the award of attorney's fees, and not the granting of the underlying
prospective relief. The Fourth Circuit correctly realized, however, that the two issues are inextricably
intertwined, and discussed the propriety of the injunctive relief before affirming the fee award. Allen v.
Burke, 690 F.2d at 378. Both parties have briefed the prospective relief issue before the Supreme Court.
Brief of Petitioner, at 10-18; Brief of Respondent at 7-1I. Given its holding in Supreme Court of Virginia
v. Consumers Union, it would seem impossible for the Court to affirm the fee award without first holding
that judges do not enjoy absolute immunity from prospective relief. See infra note 106. The Court could
conceivably avoid the issue of prospective relief by holding that judicial immunity bars a fee award whether
or not prospective relief is appropriate. Such a holding, however, would seem inconsistent with Consumers
Union. See infra text accompanying notes 107-110. What the Court clearly should not do is first determine
that attorney's fees are not appropriate, and then reach that desired result by deciding that prospective
relief is barred. The issue of prospective relief is important enough to be decided on its own merits. See
supra text accompanying notes 75-93.
'446 U.S. 719 (1980).
"'Codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). See supra note 20 for the text of the Act.
""1446 U.S. at 738-39. This holding seems consistent with the language of the Act which requires that a
plaintiff be a "prevailing party" in order to recover a fee award. It is hard to see how a plaintiff can
be a prevailing party as to a defendant who is absolutely immune from all suits, and must therefore be
dismissed as a party.
"''The Court spoke of the "enforcement functions" of the Virginia Supreme Court, rather than using
the more common term "prosecutorial function." It is clear in context, however, that the Court was writing
about "prosecutorial immunity" since the references were to Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976),
Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975), and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). The decision to initiate
a criminal prosecution on behalf of the state is a "prosecutorial" function; the decision to initiate a quasi-
criminal action (i.e., disbarment proceeding) is an "enforcement" function. Both are entitled to absolute
immunity from damages but not from injunctive relief. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 736-37.
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"The House Committee Report on the Act indicates that Congress intended
to permit attorney's fees awards in cases in which prospective relief was pro-
perly awarded against defendants who would be immune from damages awards,
H.R. Rep . No. 94-1558, p. 9 (1976).
The actual facts to which that holding applied involved an attorney's fee
award against an official acting in a prosecutorial function. There is no reason,
however, why that holding should not apply any time an official is immune
from damages awards but subject to prospective relief.
First of all, the language used by the Supreme Court is general, and not
specifically limited to prosecutorial immunity. The language of the House Report
on which the Supreme Court based its holding also refers to immunity from
damages generally and not merely prosecutorial immunity. 09 In fact, the House
Report specifically referred to Pierson v. Ray, a case involving judicial immunity
from damages.'10
Also, as noted above, both the historical background of and policy reasons
behind judicial and prosecutorial immunities are similar.'II This paper has argued
that they should therefore be treated similarly as regards amenability to
declaratory and injunctive relief. If the Court accepts this argument and holds
that judges, like prosecutors, are not immune from prospective relief, it should
also hold that judges, like prosecutors, are not immune from attorney's fees
awards.
An attorney's fee award will not interfere with the basic purpose of both
prosecutorial and judicial immunity, freeing the official to act without fear
of personal consequences to himself. The Senate Report indicates that such
fee awards will not be paid by the official personally but "like other items of
costs"' 2 will be born by the governmental agency or government for whom
"'The Court was obviously referring to the following language in the House Report:
Furthermore, while damages are theoretically available under the statutes covered by H.R. 15460,
it should be observed that, in some cases, immunity doctrines and special defenses, available only
to public officials, preclude or severely limit the damage remedy. 7 Consequently awarding counsel
fees to prevailing plaintiffs in such litigation is particularly important and necessary if Federal civil
and constitutional rights are to be adequately protected. To be sure, in a large number of cases
brought under the provisions covered by H.R. 15460, only injunctive relief is sought, and prevailing
plaintiffs should ordinarily recover their counsel fees.
H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 9 (1976). Footnote 17 in the report included a citation to Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), which held that judges were absolutely immune from damages for their judicial
acts.
1°1H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 9 (1976). See supra note 107 for the language of the House
Report.
"'Id. at n.17. The citation to Pierson v. Ray is not an unequivocal reference to judicial immunity, since
the case also involved the qualified immunity from damages available to police officers. Pierson, 386 U.S.
at 557.
.'See supra text accompanying notes 46-52.
"IS. REP. No. 1011, 94th Cong., 2d. Sess. 5 (1976).
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the official works.' 13 In Hutto v. Finney"4 the Supreme Court recognized that
in a suit for prospective relief against state prison officials acting in their official
capacities, attorney's fees would be paid not by the officials themselves, but
from the state treasury." The possibility of an award of attorneys' fees,
therefore, should not result in any fear of personal consequences to the judge
which would compromise his independent decisionmaking.
Neither should the possibility of a large award being paid by the state exert
any improper pressure on the judge's judicial activities." 6 A judge need not
fear that any unconstitutional judicial action on his part will result in signifi-
cant fee award liability by the state. Such unconstitutional action might result
in a suit for prospective relief being filed. Even if the act was in fact unconstitu-
tional, that alone would not result in more than a de minimus fee award."
7
That is because since only prospective relief may be sought, the fee award would
not be based on the judge's past conduct. Rather it would accrue only if and
to the extent that the state, on behalf of the judge, decided to litigate whether
In such cases [in which the defendants are State or local bodies or State or local officials] it is intended
that the attorney's fees, like other items of costs, will be collected either directly from the official,
in his official capacity, from funds of his agency or under his control, or from the state or local
government (whether or not the agency or government is a named party).
Id.
114437 U.S. 678 (1978).
"'Id. at 700. The Court in Hutto held that the eleventh amendment did not bar the payment of an attorney's
fee award from the state treasury. The Court gave two alternative rationales for its holding. First, Congress
has the Constitutional power to override eleventh amendment sovereign immunity when enforcing the
fourteenth amendment, Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The Court found that in passing the
Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act, Congress intended to override the eleventh amendment and
make the states liable for fee awards. Hutto, 437 U.S. at 693-94. Alternatively, the Court held that attorney's
fees should not be treated as damages, but as items of costs which are not subject to eleventh amendment
immunity to begin with. Id. 695. Both of these rationales lend strong support for the position that attorney's
fees may be awarded against a judicial officer.
"In Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), the Court held that a municipality could not
hide behind the qualified immunity of its executive officials. The Court's reasoning, however, still makes
sense when applied in the context of judicial immunity.
At the heart of this justificiation for a qualified immunity for the individual official is the concern
that the threat of personal monetary liability will introduce an unwarranted and unconscionable
consideration into the decisionmaking process, thus paralyzing the governing official's decisiveness
and distorting his judgment on matters of public policy. The inhibiting effect is significantly reduced,
if not eliminated, however, when the threat of personal liability is removed. First as an empirical
matter, it is questionable whether the hazard of municipal loss will deter a public officer from the
conscientious exercise of his duties .... More important, though, is the realization that consideration
of the municipality's liability for constitutional violations is quite properly the concern of its elected
or appointed officials. Indeed, a decisionmaker would be derelict in his duties if, at some point,
he did not consider whether his decision comports with constitutional mandates and did not weigh
the risk that a violation might result in an award of damages from the public treasury. As one
commentator aptly put it: "Whatever other concerns should shape a particular official's actions,
certainly one of them should be the constitutional rights of individuals who will be affected by
his actions. To criticize section 1983 liability because it leads decisionmakers to avoid the infringement
of constitutional rights is to criticize one of the statute's raisons d'etre."
Id. at 655-56 (quoting Note, Developments in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REV.
1133, 1224 (1977)).
"'If the filing of the complaint itself led to the cessation of the unconstitutional conduct, plaintiff would
be considered a "prevailing party" and would be entitled to fees. Morrison v. Ayoob, 627 F.2d 669 (3d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1102 (1981). Plaintiff's attorneys would receive compensation only for
the time spent on preparing the complaint, which would not normally be a large amount.
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the judge could constitutionally continue the challenged practice." 8 This deci-
sion is not judicial in nature and will normally be made not by the judge alone,
but in consultation with the attorney general.
The Supreme Court has held that Congress has the power to restrict
immunities granted to governmental entities and their officials.'I 9 In the case
of Hutto v. Finney, "I the Court held that in passing the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fees Act Congress had intended to override the eleventh amendment and sub-ject state treasuries to the payment of fee awards."'2 Since judicial immunity
is based on the common law'22 rather than the Constitution, this holding is
strong support for allowing fee awards against judges. This is especially true
since the payment of such awards will come from the same source as in Hutto,
the state treasury itself.' 3
The Court in Hutto relied first on the text of the Act itself. "The Act
itself could not be broader. It applies to 'any' action brought to enforce cer-
tain civil rights laws. It contains no hint of an exception for States defending
injunction actions; indeed the Act primarily applies to laws passed specifically
to restrain state action."' 24
The legislative history also supports an abrogation of judicial immunity,just as it did an abrogation of sovereign immunity in Hutto. As noted above,
the House Report evidences an intent to override the immunities of govern-
ment officials,' 5 while the Senate Report indicates that fee awards are to be
paid by the governmental bodies. 2 6 This is exactly the result reached in Hutto.
It is also what led the Court to conclude in Consumers Union that absolute
prosecutorial immunity from damages is not a bar to an attorney's fee award
in conjunction with prospective relief granted against an official in his enforce-
ment capacity.'27 It should lead to the same result for officials acting in their
judicial capacity.
"I'For example, in Pulliam the attorney's fee award of $7500, while not huge, was due mostly to the fact
that the constitutionally challenged practice was "vigorously contested" by the Attorney General in spite
of "anemic" support in the case law. Pulliam v. Allen, Joint App. at 26 and 41.
"'Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
20437 U.S. 678 (1978).
'"'Id. at 693-694. See supra note 115 for a discussion of the rationale used by the Court.
'"Bradley, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 347 (1872). See supra text accompanying note 30.
'"See supra text accompanying note 113.
'2"Hutto, 437 U.S. at 694.
1'"H.R. REP. No. 1558, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1976). See supra note 108, for the relevant text.
26S. REP. No. 1101, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1976). See supra note 113 for the relevant text.
'2'See supra text accompanying notes 107-110. Additional support in the legislative history comes from
the defeat of an amendment by Senator Allen which would have prohibited making a fee award against
"any state or local public official." 122 CONG. REC. 32, 298 and 32, 388-89 (1976).
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VI. CONCLUSION
State officials, when exercising judicial functions, are absolutely immune
from suits for damages brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Such officials should
not be absolutely immune from civil rights actions seeking declaratory or in-
junctive relief against them in their judicial capacity. Judicial immunity should
not bar such relief when necessary in appropriate circumstances. Otherwise,
there may be situations in which citizens will be powerless to prevent continu-
ing constitutional violations committed in the name of the state.
If prospective relief is properly granted against an official acting in a judicial
capacity, neither should judicial immunity bar an award of attorney's fees to
the prevailing party. In passing the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act
of 1976, Congress intended a fee award to accompany prospective relief, even
as against an official who enjoys absolute immunity from damages. Allowing
a fee award against a judge in such a case woulid not interfere with the pur-
poses of judicial immunity.
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